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LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 
Atahualpa Fernandez
Abstract:Localizing the brain correlates related to moral judgments, using neuroimage techniques (and 
also studies on brain lesions), seems to be, without doubt, one of the big events in the history of the 
normative social sciences.The best neuroscientific model of normative judgment available today 
establishes that the ethical-cerebral law operator  counts on, in his neural evaluative-affective systems, 
a permanent presence of requirements, obligations and strategies, with a “should be” that incorporates 
internally rational and emotional reasons, that are constitutively integrated in all the activities at the 
practical, theoretical and normal levels of every process of exercising the law. 
 
Localizing the brain correlates related to moral judgments, using neuroimage 
techniques (and also studies on brain lesions), seems to be, without doubt, one of 
the big events in the history of the normative social sciences. Indeed as 
neuroscience allows an ever more sophisticated understanding of the brain, the 
possible moral, juridical and social implications of these advances in the knowledge 
of our sophisticated ontogenetic cognitive program begin to be seriously considered 
under a much more empirical light and with respect for scientific methods.  The 
object would be, in principle, the intention to clarify the location of high cognitive 
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functions understood as Homo sapiens apomorphisms of the capacity to elaborate 
moral judgments. 
But there is no doubt that, from the evidence obtained, we can go much 
further.  These advances, however, in addition to their extraordinary scientific 
relevance, also carry important philosophical, juridical and moral connotations, 
particularly regarding the understanding of the superior cognitive processes related 
to ethical juridical judgments, which are understood as functional states of brain 
processes.  It starts from the conviction that, to understand this essential part of the 
ethical juridical universe, it is necessary to go inside the brain, to the brain substrates 
responsible for our moral judgment and whose genesis and functioning should then 
be reintegrated in the evolutionary history of our species. 
And although cognitive neuroscience research into moral judgments and 
normative judgment in law and in justice is still at a very early stage, its use seems to 
be undoubted. With one condition: that in an area as delicate as that of 
neuroscientific investigation, results should be considered with great caution.  
Because science, that certainly will serve to ensure more knowledge about human 
nature, will not be able to guarantee, by itself, moral values as they can be a greater 
respect to human life,  equality and liberty. 
This is perhaps the reason why questions and philosophic and moral doubts 
abound in the crossover area between neuroscience and law: we are in the case of 
moral judgment or other similar perceptive phenomena, before much more unitary 
and discreet cognitive processes, or are they only phenomena that emerged from 
many psychological mechanisms articulated in time and space?  Are these dead 
processes or a series of processes that have some aspect of universal character, in 
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the sense that they have some common nuclear component capable of determining 
in each individual his particular valorization of what is or is not just?  Will it be 
possible some day to describe this process or processes (or their key components) 
in more objective terms?  Should their origin be sought in some idiosyncratic pattern 
of neuroactivity that contains at least some identifiable time sequences shared by all 
the individuals?  Unlike what seems to occur in the neural base of the artistic 
faculties (Changeux, 1994; Vigouroux, 1992) , there are some neural areas whose 
specific intervention is in a certain way critical and universal in the mark of the widely 
distributed activity that a very probably subjugates – as in all the and superior 
cognitive program services (Vigouroux, 1992) – to the phenomenon of the moral 
experience?  How much  do the heredity and learning history of each individual 
contribute to starting or activating of this supposed functional pattern?  Can the 
modern neuroimage techniques be useful not only to locate the brain seat of such an 
activity trait, if only, but also, to identify the differential implication of certain 
distributed circuits? 
Especially regarding the juridical phenomenon the problem of localizing the 
brain correlates that dictate the sense of justice raises the following questions: what 
is the relationship between the results of neuroscientific investigation on moral and 
juridical cognition and the theoretical perspectives of the law?  At what point can  it 
be linked confidently and so decisively so that cognitive neuroscience questions the 
results of juridical comprehension and exercise?  How can a neuroscientific model of 
normative judgment in law and in Justice offer powerful reasons that could come to 
account for the subjacent falsity to the common conceptions of human psychology 
(and rationality)?  How much does this neuroscientific perspective have to do with 
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the current theoretical and methodological edifice of juridical science?  Or, as we are, 
how will it change our conception about Man regarding the cause and purpose of law 
and, consequently regarding the task of the jurist-interpreter to give “hermeneutic life” 
to positive law? 
Well, one of the most common fetishes of current juridical science, inherited 
from the traditional concept of the juridical method that aims to rescue the values of 
juridical order, truth and security, is to ensure that the judges should limit themselves 
to applying to individual cases the general norms to cases dictated by the legislator, 
following a formal process of  logical and subjective deduction.  It is a merely 
descriptive operation, cognoscitive of a previously established and “reproductive” 
norm of the legislator´s will (who has the exclusive responsibilities of the axiological 
and normative intentions established in the laws). Such an operation, starting from 
the supposition of emotional neutrality, of the rationality and objectivity of the 
interpreter, reduces the judge to a mere technician in applying the mechanisms of 
the law, as the responsible for the search (or simple knowledge) of his will, as the 
description, that can be true or false, of its prior and pre-existing authentic 
significance to the interpretive activity itself. 
Indeed, all the hermeneutic construction and the unit itself of the realization of 
the law elaborated by the contemporary theories assume, nowadays, the dominant 
way of explanation of the theory of rational choice, constructing a rational image from 
what seems to be, in itself, irrational.  Its fundamental concept is that, above all else, 
the judges are essentially rational and objective in their value judgments about the 
justice of the decision: they examine as well as they can the facts pertinent to the 
case and ponder, always neutrally and without emotion, the probable results that 
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would follow from each of the potential choices.  The preferred  (“just”) option is that 
the best fits the criteria of rationality and objectivity by which it was generated. 
The indicated analysis process contains, in essence, an operation 
incompatible with the knowledge accrued by neuroscience.  That is constructing a 
model of extreme rationality (of the judge’s decision) from something that is 
configured essentially as an activity with accentuated irrational components. 
But this does not seem to be an adequate image of how the brain functions 
when we formulate moral judgments about the just or unjust, such as the acceptance 
of the undoubted presence of illogical elements and, in general, from the values in 
juridical reasoning meaning that, nowadays, they already do not consider acceptable 
or legitimate the fact of continuing considering the hermeneutic  task as an operation 
or set of operations ruled exclusively by deductive or cognitive syllogism.  Indeed, the 
human mind  seems to be full of traits and defects in design that cover up our 
biological inheritance regarding full objectivity and cognitive rationality. 
The most influential theorists of positive law from the last century (especially  
Kelsen, but also Hart, with the necessary backgrounds) do not offer us a theory of 
application of the law, but rather limit themselves to considering that where there is 
no mechanical application or subjection we should speak discretion in a strong 
sense, in other words, of the creative activity of the law, understanding this to be an 
act of discretionary will in which reason appears in a merely instrumental condition.  
For Kelsen, for example, every act of interpretation is of voluntary, and not cognitive, 
nature.  From this one understands that the active “application” of the law consists in 
reality of an authentic decision, a constructive act and not merely a declarative act, 
similarly to what happens with the acts of the legislator. 
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Furthermore, not only are the majority of judicial decisions taken with relative 
speed, in complex scenarios and with partial and incomplete information and even 
under conditions of uncertainty - as the judges - in the process of exercising the law, 
do not stop being human beings imbued with every ethical concern, with certain 
values, preferences and moral intuitions, so that it does not seem legitimate or 
reasonable to interpose, in the application of the law, an impassable barrier between 
the desired objectivity and the emotional subjectivity of the interpreter.  The process 
of exercise the law on the part of the judge implies, in the last analysis, a task that 
can be considered constructive and emotional, personal and creative in a certain 
sense, although not  absolutely free or without links to the judge. 
Indeed, a single solution cannot be spoken of, a single correct response, 
meaning precisely that who applies the law can choose among various possible 
solutions, all of them correct, in other words, all of them derivable from the norms 
that integrate the juridical system and following the procedure established in it.  And 
if it is thus, if several correct solutions or responses are possible for the same 
juridical problem, the final choice, necessarily unique, is then presented as not 
derived exclusively from the system,  circumstance that immediately raises at least 
three basic questions: of epistemological  order, of axiological-political order and of 
subjective-individual order of the jurist interpreter.  
And it is this finding that makes not only the notion of habitual rationality in 
juridical science the objective of drastic revisions, but the same idea that juridical 
science is founded on objectivity, neutrality and rationality of the operator of the law 
has been assaulted recently from all directions.  Soon, starting from some 
tendencies in philosophy and in philosophy of law, but also, and maybe more 
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incisively and strongly, on the part of the cognitive scientists, of the philosophers of 
the mind and the advances from cognitive neuroscience.  And with the result that, 
although when some notion of rationality in the process of exercising the law seem 
undoubtful  (to accept the idea that intentionality is not required a task previously 
condemned to failure), the process of value derivation is not of a basically neutral, 
objective or rational nature. 
If it is certain that moral choice cannot exist without reason (individual 
preferences and instrumental reason), it is no less certain that “intuition” is  the 
characteristic human range of emotions that produces the proposals, goals, 
objectives, wants, needs, desires, fears, empathy, aversions  and the ability to feel 
other people´s pain and suffering.  We formulate moral judgments on the just and 
unjust not only because we are capable of reason (as expressed in the game theory 
and the juridical interpretation theory) but, rather, because we are equipped with 
certain innate moral intuitions and emotional stimuli that characterize human 
sensitivity and  allow us to connect potentially with all other human beings. 
Definitely, due to the fact that the evolutionary pressure did not increase (in an 
“optimal” way) human rationality, any construction of a juridical theory of exercising 
the law should imply a re-dimensioning  of the psycho-biological understanding of the 
access to reason itself.  In particular, it should start by rejecting of any conception 
about rationality objectivity and neutrality caused by ignorance of the functioning of 
our brain, especially those related to the brain correlates that intervene in the 
cognitive process of forming moral judgments to decide between the just or the 
unjust. 
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In other words, if the last factor of individualization of the response or 
conclusion of the juridical reasoning does not proceed from the juridical system 
(although it should be compatible with it), it seems obvious that the personal 
convictions of the operator of the law must take precedence.  And because for 
hermeneutics the subject-object model is not viable in the human science ambience, 
the subjectivity present in every act of understanding, interpretation and juridical 
application should be approached by analysis of the brain processes of the law 
operator.  Paraphrasing the warning by Philip Tobias (1997) regarding language, 
judgement is a brain activity.   
Thus the ethical juridical judgment based not only on reasoning but also on 
emotions and moral sentiments produced by the brain cannot be considered as 
totally independent from the constitution and functioning of this organ that, in a first 
analyses, seems not to have a single and differentiated  head centers for moral 
cognition.  The best neuroscientific model of normative judgment available today 
establishes that the ethical-cerebral law operator  counts on, in his neural evaluative-
affective systems, a permanent presence of requirements, obligations and strategies, 
with a “should be” that incorporates internally rational and emotional reasons, that 
are constitutively integrated in all the activities at the practical, theoretical and normal 
levels of every process of exercising the law. 
Indeed, the neuroscientific model of normative judgment in the law and justice 
seems to suggest that juridical reasoning implies a wide recruiting and use of 
different systems of mental skills (related both to rational and emotional thought) and 
various information sources (Goodenough & Prehn, 2005).  It is the coordinated and 
integrated activity of various brain structures that makes human moral conduct 
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possible, that is, that moral judgment integrates the frontal regions of the brain with 
other centers, in a processes that implies emotion and intuition as fundamental 
components.  And further, that each one of these brain functions intervenes in a wide 
diversity of cognitive operations, some related with social intelligence and others not 
(Green et alii 2001 and 2002; Moll et alii, 2002 and 2003). 
It seems beyond doubt the fact that the investigations in cognitive 
neuroscience of the moral, and a very especially of the normative judgment in Law 
and Justice, may provide an enormous and rich contribution to the detailed 
understanding  of the internal functioning of the human brain in the act of judging – of 
forming moral judgments about the just and the unjust.  Neuroscience may 
subminister the necessary evidence about the nature of the brain zones activated 
and the brain stimuli implied in the decision process, on the degree of personal 
involvement of the judges and the cultural conditioning in each concrete case, and 
also on the limits of rationality and the degree of influence of the emotions and the 
human sentiments in the formulation and conception about the “best decision”. 
Without forgetting of course, other distinctive aspects of the nature of human 
behavior at the time of deciding on the sense of concrete justice and the existence of 
a moral universe  determined by the biological nature of our cognitive (neuronal) 
architecture.  After all it is the brain that allows us to have a moral sense, that gives 
us the necessary skills to live in society and solve certain social conflicts and that 
serves as a base for the most sophisticated philosophical discussions and reflections 
on rights, duties, injustice and morality. 
So the neuroscientific investigation of moral and juridical cognition has, in a 
certain way, revolutionized our understanding about the nature of thought and 
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human behavior, with profound consequences that may affect the domain itself of 
the juridical phenomenon.  And as there seems to be no human institution more 
fundamental than the juridical norm and, in the field of scientific process, nothing 
more fascinating than the study of the brain, the union as these two elements 
(norm/brain) ends up representing a naturally fascinating and stimulating 
combination, since the juridical norm (its interpretation and application) and the 
behavior that seeks to regulate it are both products of mental processes. 
It is also precipitate to think that the first neuroscientific investigations about 
moral and normative judgment already open the door to a better humanity.  I fear 
that this would be to simplify things to extremes.  Thus as  ingenious creationism can 
condemn human beings to a permanent minority age, thus also an incomplete 
neuroscientific model can lead us to conceive incorrect illusions.  Because it is not  
abssolutely certain that more and better knowledge of the neuronal conditioners of 
humans will automatically give us a more dignified human life.  If only things were so 
simple! 
To think that the brain/moral/law relationship is everthing can lead us to forget 
that the measure of the law, the idea in essence of the law, is human whose nature 
results not only from a very complicated mix of genes and neurons but also from 
experiences, values, learning and influences from our equally complicated social and 
cultural life. 
The mystery of man consists precisely in warning that each person is a secret 
to himself.  Neuroscience will help us to understand a series of elements that form 
the mystery, but they will not completely eliminate it. 
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Thus, assuming the mystery will always remain, science may lead us to 
understand better that the search for an adequate methodological criterion to 
understand and realize the law can be considered, above all, as the archeology of 
these structures and brain correlates related to the processing of ethical juridical 
information. 
It could even help us to understand that the hermeutic activity is formulated 
precisely from an anthropological position and triggers the phenomenal energy of 
human action; that only from the point of view of the human being and from his 
nature can the judge represent the sense and the function of the law as a unit in a 
vital, ethical and cultural context.  This context establishes that human beings live the 
representations and meanings designed for corporation, dialogue and argumentation 
and processed in their brain structures.  That in their “exist with” and situated on a 
certain historical existential horizon, members of humanity continuously complain 
about others, whose changeability is accepted, that justifies their choices bringing 
the reasons that subject and motivate them. 
But although we still do not know much about the functioning of our brain, 
converting this sea of speculations into certainly a task waiting for science, in the 
exact sense that a deeper understanding of the ultimate causes (rooted in our 
nature) of human moral and juridical behavior may be very useful to ascertain which 
are the limits and the conditions of possibility of ethics and the law in the context of 
contemporary societies. 
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